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The role of identity in support for supranational integration  
in EU Foreign and Security Policies 
Osman Sabri Kiratli Bogazici University, School of Applied Disciplines, 
International Trade Department 
Abstract: This paper examines the effect of popular identification with Europe and the 
European Union on the level of governments’ willingness to consent to supranational 
reforms of foreign and security policies. Applying ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression on a series of statistical analyses based on data provided by Eurobarometer 
and state positions prior to the three major EU treaties (the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the 
1997 Amsterdam Treaty and the 2004 Constitutional Treaty), this paper concludes that 
higher levels of European identification by citizens greatly increase domestic support for 
joint decision-making in foreign and defence policies which in turn pushes governments 
to adopt more integrationist positions during negotiations.  
Keywords: European identity; CFSP; supranationalism; public opinion; political science. 
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Introduction 
Intergovernmentalism is still the defining characteristic of the European Union’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policies (CFSP) today. Member states are in charge as the 
primary actors of shaping the scope and speed of foreign policy integration. In that, there 
is a striking difference with the affairs of the former EC pillar, where the Commission 
enjoys a great degree of autonomy and power in constructing EU policy, the EP is 
relatively influential in decision-making, and the use of qualified majority voting (QMV) 
in the Council of Ministers has increased substantially over the years of integration.  
Yet despite the degree of differences, a gradual move towards more supranationalism in 
the functioning of common foreign and security affairs was evident in each of the major 
treaty revisions. Divergent state positions during the exhaustive debates and negotiation 
EIoP   © 2015 Osman Sabri Kiratli 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2015-007a.htm 3 
processes for the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 and the 
Constitutional Treaty in 2004 revealed that some members no longer hold the same level 
of sympathy and preference for the preservation of intergovernmentalism in these 
sensitive areas. Parallel to changes in state preferences, the public also seems to embrace 
a much more approving stance towards further integration as evidenced by consistent 
support for foreign and security policies in surveys (Peters 2011).  
This paper aims to examine the slow yet steady shift toward further supranationalism in 
foreign policy and defence which according to the realist discourse constitute the very 
core of state sovereignty and are thus expected to remain under the firm grips of nation-
states. To explain the growing enthusiasm for the pooling of sovereignty over the course 
of negotiations on these two policy areas during the last two decades, this paper visits 
constructivist approaches and tests whether actors’ identities play a role in shaping their 
interests. In this theoretical configuration, “actors” denote not only negotiating partners, 
i.e., nation-states, but equally so the public, whose collective identity molds state 
identities through democratic mechanisms.  
Thus, the research question to be investigated in the following pages is whether states 
whose constituencies have higher levels of self-identification with Europe are more likely 
to willingly give up some of their sovereign rights and veto power to a more 
encompassing entity and support supranational integration on foreign and defence 
policies. In this pursuit, this paper aims to contribute to the literature in two ways: first, 
by exploring how public opinion on European integration is formed specifically on 
foreign and security policies; and second, by testing the extent to which domestic public 
opinion is a variable in the formation of state positions in EU negotiations. Unlike the 
previous studies that aimed to explain the sources of support for common foreign and 
security policies (Carrubba and Singh 2004, Schoen 2008, Foucault, Irondelle and 
Mérand 2009, Koenig-Archibugi 2004), this study aims to capture the dynamic nature of 
the relationship between self-identification and support for integration by presenting a 
longitudinal analysis covering three major treaty negotiations and three Eurobarometers 
over the course of ten years, while simultaneously providing a more robust analysis of 
government responsiveness during the key junctures of the European integration process. 
The next section will offer a theoretical discussion of competing explanations on public 
attitude formation towards European integration and the relevance of public opinion on 
government positions. The second section will present the hypotheses to be tested and 
outline the research design and operationalization. The third section will discuss the 
findings based on a series of statistical analyses and the last section will conclude the 
paper.  
EIoP   © 2015 Osman Sabri Kiratli 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2015-007a.htm 4 
1. Public opinion and supranational integration 
From the very beginning, the EC was an elite-driven project with very little, if any, public 
input in decision-making processes (Gaubatz 1995). The idea of a ‘permissive 
consensus’, termed by Lindberg and Scheingold, that pointed to a generally favourable 
prevailing attitude among the public towards European integration, was widely accepted 
among scholars working on this historically unique integration scheme (1970). According 
to the ‘permissive consensus’ hypothesis, the public did not have a coherent and 
structured attitude on integration and was volatile and susceptible to manipulation 
(Inglehart 1970, Stavridis 1992). Furthermore, issues on integration had low saliency in 
party competition and were largely unrelated to other, more ideological conflicts of 
political competition (Hooghe and Marks 2009, 7) 
The Danish referenda on the Maastricht Treaty was the first shock that showed that 
public opinion can indeed influence the direction, content and speed of integration. With 
the visibility of common policies that directly affected citizens’ lives and welfares, such 
as a common currency or immigration, issues on Europe became salient and party 
competitions were shaped accordingly. Euroskepticism grew gradually during the decade 
and populist right-wing parties became the beneficiaries of growing public discontent. 
The period of permissive consensus, which was once taken for granted by policy-makers, 
was replaced with a period of ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009).  
In this transition from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus, convergence in 
opinion between the elites and the public became a requirement to push the integration 
process forward as any divergence between the two ran the risk of serious legitimacy 
problems and had the potential to halt integration altogether (Peters 2011, 5-6). The close 
vote in the Irish referenda against the Nice Treaty, the rejections of the Constitutional 
Treaty in the French and Dutch referenda and finally, the rejection of Lisbon in another 
referendum in Ireland were major incidents in which public opinion had a dramatic 
impact on the integration process. Each negative reaction in referenda since Maastricht 
resulted in the expansion of the subsidiarity principle in the institutional setting of the 
Union. Active public participation was promoted by the political elites in an attempt to 
overcome the democratic deficit and increase the legitimacy of the Union (see Eriksen 
and Fossum 2000). 
Though an ‘electoral connection’ between the elites and the public has proven to be vital 
for the future prospects of integration, following the traditional route of the Lipmann-
Almond consensus, it is possible that citizens’ positions, as passive recipients of 
discourses from the top, could be molded by the elites. As summarized by Hooghe and 
Marks (2009, 10), if individuals have no time or prior knowledge of the issue, they may 
rely on cues provided by the actors possessing knowledge and political power. It is 
possible therefore, in situations where the public is disinterested or ill-informed, to 
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observe an overlap between the attitudes of the elite and the public, but this is 
conditioned by the elites who drive the public on matters related to European integration 
(Zaller 1992, Popkin 1991).  
The alternative route is from the bottom to the up. The bottom-up dynamic starts with the 
assumption that in the post-Maastricht context of political competition, the direction of 
the cueing effect changed from the elites to the public such that the elites must pay close 
attention to the public when negotiating European integration. Political parties of 
European polities, with the intention of receiving more votes, regularly monitor public 
opinion and shape their positions accordingly (Carrubba 2001). In established 
democracies, gaps between public opinion and government policies run the risk of 
policy-makers being punished in elections. Thus, rather than ignoring them, rational, 
vote-seeking policy-makers seek to address public preferences and engage in public 
debate to succeed in political competition. Once elected, the party in office conducts 
policies that are in line with its electoral preferences. The elected government assigns 
national representatives to a body of EU institutions, including the EU Council of 
Ministers, which approves of EU laws. Furthermore, the heads of governments 
participate in the European Council and decide the agenda for the future of the integration 
process (Gabel 2000, 57). Public opinion can also act as a supervisory force for national 
parliaments in dealings with pieces of EU legislations (Katz and Wessels 1999). 
A number of studies proposed that in post-Maastricht Europe, integration has indeed 
affected domestic political competition and vote-seeking elites have taken positions 
accordingly, providing evidence for the bottom-up route over the top-down (e.g. Evans 
1999, Tillman 2004, Evans and Butt 2007, Gabel 2000, de Vries 2007, Raunio 1999). 
Based on expert surveys, Steenbergen and Scott (2004) claimed the role of European 
integration in domestic party programs greatly increased between 1984 and 1996. It 
would not be wrong to assume that this has only grown since 1996. In another study 
employing content analysis of the media in several member states, Kriesi found that the 
number of statements on European issues in national election campaigns rose from 2.5 
percent in the 1970s to 7 percent in the 1990s (2007). Similarly, Kenneth Benoit and 
Michael Laver demonstrated that in 2003, European integration was still only the third-
most salient issue in party competition after tax rates and privatization (2006). In a 
similar vein, Tapio Raunio showed that during the 1990s, Finnish political parties 
strategically adjusted their policies on European integration to increase their share of 
votes (Raunio 1999). 
The conclusion reached by these studies is that European integration is a significant 
factor in the election behaviour of European citizens. Concerns over integration have 
created a new electoral cleavage in national elections which opens up new possibilities 
for political competition. Domestic elites in turn have an incentive to differentiate 
themselves from the others and reorient based on public opinion. As van der Eijk and 
Franklin suggest, the EU is a ‘sleeping giant’ in the sense that issues related to integration 
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have the potential to upset the structure of domestic political mobilization in Europe (van 
der Eijk and Franklin 2004, 33).  
The effect of European integration on domestic political competition has not been 
uniform across policy areas. Analyzing the relationship between citizen support for 
European monetary integration and electoral support of political parties, Geoffrey Evans 
and Sarah Butt showed that the Conservative Party’s European policy and its position on 
the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) negatively affected its electoral support (2007). 
Similarly, Scheve found that voting behaviour in Britain and France is closely influenced 
by European monetary integration (Scheve 1999).  
Though foreign and security policies are traditionally much less politicized compared to 
monetary policies in domestic politics, there is a strong possibility that integration at the 
European level in these sensitive domains can offer new openings for political 
competition. With the EU becoming more active in security and defence policies and 
undertaking military or humanitarian operations in distant parts of the world from Mali to 
Ukraine, the saliency of integration in foreign and security policies inevitably increased 
and thus the autonomy of political elites with respect to public opinion in shaping the 
direction of integration dramatically decreased. Yet, unlike issues on economic 
integration, the dynamics of how public attitude towards foreign policy cooperation is 
shaped are complicated, and therefore deserve scholarly attention. Though utilitarian 
calculations can have greater power in forming attitudes on matters related to economic 
integration due to the increased visibility and effect of such policies on citizens’ lives, in 
foreign policy cooperation, citizens usually lack the necessary information, including on 
technical issues. This practical problem of ‘bounded rationality’1 can lead to two 
consequences: One, individuals form their opinion on foreign policy cooperation by 
transferring their opinion about visible facets of integration such as economic integration 
(Blondel, Sinnott and Svensson 1998). Two, without a clear guideline and a ready cost-
benefit calculus, individuals form their opinion based on an appropriate course of action 
derived from the identity they have constructed for themselves.  
Identities are both a function of an actor’s self-understanding and his/her interactions 
with others. They create a sense of commonness among the groups of individuals, 
according to which they form an ‘imagined community’ based on a particularistic identity 
component and define an ‘other’ which does not share the characteristics of this identity. 
As such, social identities have internal and external dimensions: The internal dimension 
refers to the set of norms, values and discourses that creates and holds the social group 
                                                 
1
 Unlike the perfect rationality models that assume that individuals are fully informed, perfectly logical and 
pursue maximum utility, the model of bounded rationality starts with the assumption that the rationality of 
individuals is limited by imperfect information, finite time and cognitive deficiencies. As such, decision-
making is usually a process of satisficing -eliminating the existing alternatives until an acceptable threshold 
is found- rather than optimization, which is finding the best alternative available. See for a detailed 
discussion on bounded rationality Gigerenzer and Selten 2002. 
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together (Smith 1991) while the external dimension concerns the self-placement of this 
community relative to similar entities and other actors (Banchoff 1997, 12).  
Identities are not acquired automatically. The construction of the practices and discourses 
that form an identity are attained through a process of identification and the most 
influential source of identification is “the self-generated subjective identifications that 
individuals make spontaneously” (Suny 2001). Self-identification can be linked to 
emotional attachments and subjective preferences which have a basis in primordial 
categories such as race or religion. Self-identifications can also have an ideational basis; 
the discursive context in which actors find themselves and the narratives that shape their 
perceptions, understandings of the world, and behavioral codes and values could drive 
them to identify themselves as a part of a particular group. Finally, self-identification can 
stem from utilitarian calculations, albeit seldomly. The actors can adopt an identity with 
the belief that this identity will enhance one’s (or the group’s) utility. Conversely, in 
cases where the actors fear the loss of individual or group resources as a result of 
identification with another collective, the identity in question would be resisted (McLaren 
2006, 49).  
Drawing from these insights, we postulate that, as a critical part of community building 
processes, the public's self-identification with Europe, how they construct their self-held 
images and how they situate themselves and other actors within the framework of 
European integration has an important effect on their willingness to transfer some 
national sovereignty to the supranational level. Accordingly, the masses with higher 
levels of European and EU identification should be expected to be more likely to support 
supranational cooperation. A more positive identification with Europe and the European 
Union will promote the notion of we-ness and the belief of belonging to the same whole. 
It will generate the perception that it is not necessarily a zero-sum game between Brussels 
and the national capital but that both parties can benefit from the transfer of competencies 
to the supranational level. A negative identification with Europe, by contrast, will cause 
the masses to restrict the inclusive concept of ‘we-ness’ to only those sharing the same 
national affinity, strengthening the feeling that some of the national sovereign rights are 
‘surrendered’ to the ‘others’, those sitting at a distant capital that do not share the same 
identity as ‘us’ (Koenig-Archibugi 2004, 146). Given this, intergovernmentalism, instead 
of supranationalism, will be the expected choice of institutional structure since it will 
protect the veto power for cases which cannot be effectively addressed by those ‘foreign’ 
communities. The reluctance to consent to the transfer of authority to a supranational 
entity will be particularly strong in foreign and defence policies as these policy areas 
touch on core aspects of the notion of national sovereignty. 
Although scientific inquiries that test the relationship between identity and European 
integration on foreign and security policies are few and scattered (e.g. Schoen 2008), 
there is a rich literature that problematizes identities and self-identification as a source of 
individual attitude towards European integration as a general political objective. In a 
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notable example, Lauren McLaren (2002) argued that preferences for European 
integration are not only shaped by cost-benefit calculus or cognitive mobilization, but 
more so by antipathy or sympathy towards other cultures. Similarly, in various studies, 
scholars found that stronger national attachments and pride usually result in negative 
support for European integration (Christin and Trechsel 2002, Carey 2002) and specific 
common policy areas (Kaltenthaler and Anderson 2001). As Carey notes, the stronger an 
individual’s attachment to his/her nation, the less likely it will be for that individual to 
consent to measures that can reduce the nation state’s control of politics (Carey 2002, 
391). Borrowing from Deutsch, Carey also elaborates on the notion of terminal 
community, the highest political entity an individual owes allegiance to (Carey 2002, 
391, see also Deutsch 1966). For individuals who believe in the existence of a European 
identity and consider the EU their terminal community, the Union has the legitimate 
authority to formulate policies. For those who take their nation-states as their terminal 
communities, on the other hand, the EU’s growing role in policy-making processes would 
be considered unjustified and an attack on the national community.  
As opposed to ideational factors, the alternative and dominant line of theories to explain 
individual attitude towards integration originates from the rationalist, homo economicus 
voter model. The main assumption of this utilitarian school is that citizens’ evaluations of 
the economic costs and benefits of integration both for themselves and for the group they 
are a part of form the basis of their opinion towards Europe (Eichenberg and Dalton 
1993; Gabel 1998a; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Anderson and Reichert 1995). Accordingly, 
it is suggested, support for integration is dependent on the material benefits obtained by 
the country in general and the citizen in particular (Gabel and Whitten 1997; Gabel 
1998b). As an example of the former, examining the effects of macroeconomic factors, 
inflation, unemployment and growth, Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) concluded that 
national economic performance and benefits acquired under membership are correlated 
with popular support for the Union, though this correlation has significantly weakened 
since Maastricht. Studies of the latter group, however, abound. From early on, scholars 
working on public attitudes towards Europe theorized that those who directly benefit 
from integration show higher levels of support for integration. European economic 
integration and market liberalization benefit those with higher levels of human capital 
while, at the same time, negatively affect unskilled labour due to the increased mobility 
of capital vis-à-vis labour (Rodrik 1997). The mobility of capital also pressurizes high tax 
countries to finance welfare programs, whose main beneficiaries are unskilled segments 
of the labour force (Huber and Stephens 2001). All these factors support the conclusion 
that those with higher levels of education, professional skills and income are more likely 
to support European integration whereas those without these attributes are more likely to 
be against.  
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2. Research design and operationalization 
The primary hypothesis of this paper is that the stronger the popular self-identification 
with Europe, the more supportive of supranational action in foreign and security policies 
states will be. The intermediary mechanism which links self-identification at the 
individual level with state positions at the national level is public opinion. Therefore, this 
paper makes two related assumptions: First, state support for supranational integration in 
foreign and security policies derives from public support for supranational integration in 
those policy areas. Second, public support for supranational integration in foreign and 
security policies derives from individual self-identification with Europe. Figure 1 
illustrates the causal mechanism offered in this paper. 
Figure 1: Effect of European identification on government support for 
 supranationalism 
 
The statistical analysis used to test these hypotheses is based on two different models.  
Model I tests the effect of European identification on support for joint decision-making in 
foreign and defence policies at the individual level. The control variables incorporated in 
Model I are perception of benefits from membership, general support for EU 
membership, trust in Americans/the United States, left-right positioning, education, age 
and income. Relying on individual data involving categorical dependent variables, fixed 
effects logit regression is adopted.  
Model II tests the effect of European identification on state positions towards further 
supranationalism relying on country-level variables. Twelve member states are included 
in the analysis for Maastricht and fifteen member states are included for the Amsterdam 
and Constitutional treaties. European identification at the aggregate level is juxtaposed 
against several control variables, including citizen perception of benefits from 
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membership, national Gross Domestic Product (GDP), inflation, trust in Americans/the 
United States and support for joint decision-making in foreign and defence policies. In 
this model, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is adopted.  
2.1. Dependent and intervening variables 
The dependent variable of this study, government preferences for supranational 
cooperation on foreign and security policies, is operationalized by an analysis of 
governments’ positions on proposals to enhance the supranational character of 
cooperation in these policy domains during the series of Intergovernmental Conferences 
(IGC) convened prior to the three major treaty reforms: Maastricht Treaty, Amsterdam 
Treaty, and Constitutional Treaty
2
.  
In the three IGCs preceding those treaties, three sets of items were addressed and 
intensely negotiated to increase supranational EU competences, causing divergent 
responses between the more integration-minded states and the sovereign-minded ones. 
Though there were considerable overlaps across IGCs, such as enhanced use of the QMV 
in the foreign policy pillar, several of the items on the agenda were unique to specific 
reform waves. Below are the three sets of reform proposals on the agenda of each IGC: 
Maastricht  
1- Introducing more QMV for decisions of principle. 
2- Introducing more QMV for decisions of implementation. 
3- Increasing the powers of the European Commission in foreign policy-making. 
4- Bringing foreign policy cooperation under the Community pillar, ‘tree model’  
 vs. ‘temple’-pillar structure. 
5- Adopting a common defence clause. 
Amsterdam  
1- Introducing more QMV for decisions of principle. 
2- Introducing more QMV for decisions of implementation. 
3- Increasing the powers of the European Commission in CFSP. 
4- Increasing the powers of the European Parliament in CFSP. 
5- Establishing new supranational institutions at the EU level regarding CFSP. 
6- Integration of the WEU to the EU. 
                                                 
2
 Though the Constitutional Treaty never came into force following the rejections raised by the French and 
Dutch referendums, due to the fact that the core changes incorporated into the foreign and security policy 
sections of the Constitutional Treaty were preserved in the Treaty of Lisbon (e.g. a permanent presidency 
system, extensive use of QMV and further use of enhanced cooperation mechanisms, the newly created 
post of the Foreign High Representative by merging two previously separate posts - the European 
Commissioner for External Relations and the High Representative of the CFSP), the negotiations of the 
Lisbon process are excluded from the analysis. 
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Constitutional 
1- Introducing more QMV on CFSP and European Security and Defence Policy  
 (ESDP). 
2- Institutionalizing the posts of Presidency of the European Council and Ministry 
 for Foreign Affairs in a supranational format. 
3- Effective utilization of ‘enhanced cooperation’ mechanisms in CFSP and  
 ESDP. 
4- Adopting a mutual assistance clause. 
5- Establishing new supranational institutions at the EU level regarding CFSP and 
 ESDP. 
Data on state preferences which compiles official memorandums, public statements and 
position papers were acquired using three different sources. Laursen and Vanhoonacker’s 
book The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union: institutional reforms, new 
policies, and international identity of the European Community provides a collection of 
official documents supplemented by detailed discussions on state positions. Another set 
of white papers issued by member states during the preparation stage of the Amsterdam 
Treaty was accessed through The European Union Constitution & CIDEL Project hosted 
by the University of Zaragoza
3
. Finally, for the Constitutional Treaty, Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) Watch Reports prepared by officially supported 
representatives of member states and published by FORNET, a network of research and 
teaching on European Foreign Policy funded by the European Commission's Fifth 
Framework Programme, are utilized
4
.  
Once member governments’ responses to these three sets of proposals in three IGCs are 
assessed, a supranationality score is created. To construct this index, each fully 
supportive position is given 2 points while no support is assigned -1 points. Additionally, 
two intermediary positions are defined: The first comprises states which had conditions 
for an affirmative vote and/or expressed certain reservations, though without ceasing 
support for the proposal. On position papers and official memorandums, states which 
explicitly expressed a condition in exchange for a favourable vote or announced a 
theoretical support provided certain conditions were met are coded under this category. 
This ‘reluctant/conditional yes position’ is coded 1 point. There are also states which, 
albeit not strongly critical of the proposal, had certain reservations large enough to 
prevent them from supporting it. Compared to a no-support position which is laden with 
the words ‘red-lines’ or ‘oppositions’ without any given justification, states under this 
                                                 
3
 The database of The European Union Constitution & CIDEL Project hosted by the University of 
Zaragoza is available online at: http://www.proyectos.cchs.csic.es/euroconstitution/Home.htm,  
10.01.2015. 
4
 All reports and the Fornet database are available online at LSE Fornet Archive: http://www.lse. 
ac.uk/internationalRelations/centresandunits/EFPU/FORNETarchive.aspx, 10.01.2015. 
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category are expected to vocalize their doubts that lead to opposition and therefore opens 
up the possibility for further negotiations. This position is labeled ‘reluctant/skeptical’ 
and coded 0. No available information is also coded 0. The unequivocal and concise 
nature of position papers issued by governments prior to IGCs minimizes errors or 
validity problems resulting from the coding process, particularly in relation to 
intermediary categories.  
One caveat is necessary regarding state positions. As a natural part of ongoing 
negotiations, governments have time and again changed their positions on some items. 
One example is the British opposition to permanent structured cooperation during the 
negotiations of the Constitutional Treaty which shifted to conditional support in the 
aftermath of the Franco-British-German trilateral talks in November of 2003. This paper, 
however, only takes the initial positions into consideration before any bargaining process 
began. Given the fact that the three EU conferences under study did not only deal with 
foreign and defence policies, there is the possibility that elite positions on foreign and 
defence policies might be some byproducts of elite decision-making concerning other 
policy domains. Although, as Michael Smith notes (2004, 24), room for issue linkages 
and securing package deals is very limited within the institutional structure of CFSP, 
during negotiations, state elites can strategically attempt to link policy domains for 
substantive reasons or by log-rolling. In this process, state positions on foreign and 
defence policy integration might in fact stem from factors other than domestic support. 
By deriving state positions from official documents issued before the IGCs began, this 
possible distortion and validity problem is eliminated (see Appendix I for the respective 
tables which present states’ positions on each of the three IGCs and the correlated 
supranationality scores). 
The intervening variable of this study is public support for joint decision-making in 
foreign and security policies. Public opinion data in the form of Eurobarometers (EB), 
which are large-scale surveys gathered by the European Commission twice a year in 
member and candidate countries, are utilized to measure support for joint decision-
making. In an attempt to present a longitudinal analysis, three EB surveys, each 
conducted during the peak of treaty negotiations, are analyzed: EB 35 published in June 
1991, EB 46 published in May 1997, and EB 58 published in December 2002.  
The relevant question in these Eurobarometers asks respondents whether they support 
national or joint decision-making with Europe on a wide range of policy areas, including 
foreign policy and defence. For an aggregate level analysis, the number of respondents 
who chose the European level as the preferred area of decision-making is subtracted from 
the number of those who chose the national level, for each country and for each policy 
area. For the individual level analysis, those in favour of joint decision-making are coded 
1, while those against are coded 0. 
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2.2. Independent variables 
The explanatory variable tested is the level of European identification. In democratic 
systems, public opinion data can provide critical insights into self-categorization and the 
level of belonging to Europe (Banchoff 1999). Thus, two versions of an EB question and 
the relevant data are processed to measure the independent variable. The first version 
asks: “Do you ever think of yourself as not only [nationality], but also European? Does 
this happen often, sometimes or never?” This version was regularly posed to respondents 
until 1992, when it was replaced with the second version: “In the near future, do you see 
yourself as: [nationality] only; [nationality] and European; European and [nationality]; or 
European only?”  
In Model I, based on individual data, the standard EB coding scheme is followed and the 
answer of ‘[nationality] only’ is coded 1, ‘[nationality] and European’ 2, ‘European and 
[nationality]’ 3 and ‘European only’ 4. In Model II, averaged levels of self-identification 
with Europe are used as a proxy for collective identity. Based on aggregate data in order 
to operationalize this model, an index is created for both versions of the EB question. For 
version 1, the answers ‘never’ are coded 0, ‘sometimes’ coded 1 and ‘often’ coded 2. For 
version 2, the answers ‘European only’ are coded 3, ‘European and [nationality]’ 2, 
‘[nationality] and European’ 1 and finally ‘[nationality] only’ 0. In both versions, the 
European identification scores are computed by taking the average across respondents.  
2.3. Control variables 
A set of control variables is added to the models to test the validity of competing 
explanations. As suggested, indicators of economy can influence individuals to process 
information on economic conditions to form a positive opinion on European integration. 
Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) suggested that inflation and intra-EU export balances are 
explanatory factors in aggregate levels of support for the EU, but not so much EU budget 
returns, GDP or unemployment. Therefore, inflation is added to the country-level 
analysis as a measure of national economic performance. Inflation data for each year of 
investigation (1991, 1996 and 2002) has been acquired from the OECD Data Bank. At 
the individual level of analysis, household income is included as an objective economic 
indicator. 
Economic variables can provide citizens rough evaluations with which to form a positive 
or negative posture towards European integration in general, but foreign and security 
policy cooperation is a different animal. Applying the insights of the rationalist model, a 
control variable tested in both Model I and II is citizen perception of the utility of EC/EU 
membership for one’s nation. It is assumed that as citizens find membership in the 
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interest of his/her polity, s/he would be rationally inclined to support deepening 
integration. The relevant question in the EB surveys asks respondents if they agree that 
their country has on average benefited from being a member of the European 
Community/Union. In Model I, standard EB coding is applied. In Model II, the 
percentage of negative responses is subtracted from the percentage of affirmative 
responses. 
Since cooperation in “high politics” is a sensitive issue for states with more at stake, 
previous alliances and the country’s positioning towards the United States in particular 
can be an important factor in government willingness to contribute to the attempts to 
create a collective security power at the EU level. It might be expected that traditionally 
Atlanticist members and their citizens would be more reluctant to transfer some of their 
competences to Brussels, which in time could turn out to be a challenger to the US as a 
security provider (Cornish and Edwards 2001). By the same token, members who hold 
long-lasting distrust towards the other side of the Atlantic would display more enthusiasm 
in such efforts. Thus, individual and aggregate attitudes towards the US are incorporated 
into the models. In EB 35 and 46, this variable is captured by the relevant question which 
asks respondents how much trust s/he has in Americans. Because that question is not 
asked in EB 58, another question which asks whether the respondent believes the US 
plays “a positive”, “a negative” or “neither a positive nor a negative” role for peace in the 
world is utilized for our purposes. In Model I, standard EB coding is followed. In Model 
II, means are calculated by applying the coefficients 4, 3, 2 and 1 respectively to the 
various answer frequencies. 
Another control variable added to Model II is state capabilities. From a realist 
perspective, major powers would be more reluctant to join in any foreign policy 
cooperation if they believe they already have the necessary resources and capabilities to 
pursue an independent foreign policy. Even if they are set on cooperation, realists would 
expect the cooperative mechanism to be of an intergovernmental character, since states 
with higher capabilities should not see any need to renounce their autonomy and give up 
some of their sovereign rights in favour of a supranational institution. Smaller states, by 
contrast, would support such institutionalization to increase their own influence in world 
affairs when the EU acts as a unit and to shackle the hands of stronger states that could 
pose a threat to them in the future (Koenig-Archibugi 2004, 145). Even though what 
exactly constitutes state power is an open question in the literature, a rough indicator is 
sheer GDP figures. Consequently, GDP figures obtained from the OECD are included in 
the Model. 
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The final three control variables at the individual level of analysis are citizen 
partisanship, age and education. Several studies have found that citizens’ support for 
integration closely follows the position they place themselves on the left-right axis and 
the parties they support (e.g. Franklin, Marsh and Wlezien 1994; Franklin, van der Eijk 
and Marsh 1995, Gabel 1998a). In general, it is assumed that those on the right are more 
positively disposed towards European integration than those on the left (Hooghe and 
Marks 2005), though extreme right-wing supporters are usually among the staunchest 
critics (Steenbergen, Edwards and de Vries 2007). Previous research has also pointed to 
two positive effects of education on public opinion. First, higher levels of education help 
individuals develop cognitive skills to process information related to integration and 
grasp it with ease (Inglehart 1970). Second, higher levels of education could result in 
greater human capital which will increase the likelihood that the recipient will be a net 
beneficiary of integration (Gabel and Palmer 1995). Finally, it is reported that age has a 
negative effect on support for European integration. For these three variables, no 
recoding or regrouping is applied and standard EB coding is followed.  
One last control variable incorporated in Model I is support for European integration. It 
would be expected that those who are already in favour of European integration as a 
general political ideal would be supportive of joint decision-making regardless of the 
issue area. To extract the statistical effect of European identification on support for joint 
decision-making independent of support for European integration, the EB question which 
asks respondents whether they think EC/EU membership is “a good thing”, “a bad thing” 
or “neither good or bad” is utilized. 
3. Findings and discussion 
The application of Model I reveals that at the individual level, three factors are 
statistically significant at p<0.01 in all three Eurobarometers for both foreign policy and 
defence: European identification, the perceived benefits for one’s country from 
membership, and support for membership. This means those with higher levels of 
European identification, those who believe their country has benefitted from membership 
and those who evaluate EU membership positively are more likely to support joint 
decision-making in both foreign policy and defence. The fact that the significance is 
consistently verified in all six cases increases the validity of our findings. 
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Table 1: Model I (Results of Fixed Effect Logit Regression) 
   EB 58        EB 46        EB 35       EB 58       EB 46       EB 35      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
EU Identific. 0.41*** 0.29*** 0.22*** 0.33*** 0.24*** 0.12*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
Benefits 0.30*** 0.27*** 0.40*** 0.29*** 0.39*** 0.58*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
 
Support for -0.46*** -0.51*** -0.25*** -0.51*** -0.47*** -0.27*** 
EU membership (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
 
Trust in US -0.07** -0.09*** -0.05 -0.03 -0.13*** -0.11*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
 
Left-Right -0.03** 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
 
Education 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.03** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
 
Age 0.03* -0.00 0.03 -0.02 -0.07*** -0.04* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
Income 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.03 0.05* 0.04 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Country Fixed  
Effects? YES  YES    YES  YES  YES YES 
Number of  
Countries 15  15 12 15 15 12 
N 7267 7655 6291 7146 7541 6158 
Log likelihood -4209.86 -4180.36 -4021.37 -3672.68 -3933.98 -3242.26 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
DV: Support for Joint Decision Making in Defence (first three columns)  
and Foreign Policy (last three columns). 
Robust standard errors clustered by countries are in parentheses. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Several conclusions could be drawn from these results: First, the hypothesis that expects 
a positive relation between individual European identification and support for joint 
decision-making in foreign and security policies is strongly supported. Building on the 
findings of studies which found a positive relationship between European identity and 
support for European integration, this study provides evidence that self-identification 
with Europe is equally significant in shaping attitudes towards foreign and security 
policies. Controlling the support for EU membership in our analysis allows us to 
conclude that this relationship is refined from the general support for the integration 
process. This means European identification has a discrete and statistically significant 
effect on support for supranational decision-making in these specific policy areas.  
The subjective evaluation of membership in the EU appears to be another significant 
factor in citizen support for joint decision-making. Accordingly, individuals who think 
their country has benefitted from membership and believe that EU membership is a 
“good thing” also display greater enthusiasm for joint decision-making. Although our 
model does not allow us to extract the criteria according to which individuals evaluate the 
perceived benefits or how they reach the conclusion that the EU is a “good thing”, this 
result could be taken as support for rational voter arguments.  
Another statistically significant effect is the level of trust in the United States. The 
negative coefficients and the strongly significant confidence intervals tell us that 
individuals who have a lower opinion of Americans/the US are more supportive of joint 
decision-making in foreign and security policy, providing evidence that the Atlanticists 
vs. Europeanists divide is real and effective in forming opinions, at least in citizens’ 
minds. In EB 35 and 46, which asked respondents how much they trust Americans, this 
result is more concrete, particularly in foreign policy. In EB 58, our conclusion is less 
convincing and we can assume that the different question used for analysis is responsible 
for this. Accordingly, in EB 58, those who believe that the US plays a negative role in 
maintaining peace in the world are only slightly more supportive of joint decision-making 
in defence.  
Considering the effects of economic variables, the model reveals only weak statistical 
relationships. As suggested, it is well accepted that those with lower incomes and lower 
human capital may be adversely affected by integration and are thus more likely to 
oppose European integration. Yet, in our model in EB 46 and 58, we observe a strongly 
significant effect only for joint decision-making in defence. Though positive feelings 
towards integration in more visible and salient areas such as the economy can be 
transferred to shape citizens’ opinion on other issue areas, our finding suggests that 
economic considerations may not easily apply to foreign and security policies. Still, given 
that the relationship between income and support for joint decision-making is 
strengthened in each survey under investigation, one can speculate that the divide in 
socio-economic conditions may hamper efforts to deepen cooperation in foreign and 
security policies in the future.  
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Model I also indicated some ambiguous impacts of age and left-right positioning on 
support for joint decision-making. Among the six cases, in EB 35 and 46 in foreign 
policy and in EB 58 in defence, age was found to be statistically significant, albeit to 
differing degrees. Similarly, in EB 58 in defence, the left-right positioning was found to 
be statistically significant. Yet, the small value of coefficients and the inconsistency in 
the direction of impact prevents us from drawing definite conclusions from this analysis. 
However crudely, the weakness of the left-right positioning on public attitude also 
provides support for the argument that the cueing effect of parties on the public on the 
integration of foreign and security policies is limited at best. Instead of top-down, 
bottom-up connections seem to be more salient in those issue areas. This conclusion also 
increases the theoretical validity of our second model, which assumes that the EU 
identification of the public, i.e., the bottom, indeed makes an impact on state behaviour, 
i.e., the top.  
Table 2: Model II (Results of OLS Regression) 
Model II.a 
DV: Supranationalism Score 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Constitutional     Amsterdam Maastricht 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
EU Identific. 0.05 0.03 -0.04 
 (0.04) (1.00) (0.03) 
Joint Defense 0.08*** 0.14** 0.13*** 
 (0.26) (0.05) (0.02) 
GDP 1.85 -2.08 3.65** 
 (8.26) (2.35) (1.34) 
Trust in US -12.46*** 1.56 -7.35*** 
 (2.47) (6.19) (1.76) 
Inflation      -1.06 0.47 0.29** 
 (0.92) (1.21) (0.10) 
Benefits -0.35 -0.05 0.14*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) 
Constant             28.46*** 0.52 18.64** 
 (6.08) (20.30) (6.25) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
N 15 15 12 
R-squared 0.91 0.71 0.95 
  (Table continues on next page) 
EIoP   © 2015 Osman Sabri Kiratli 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2015-007a.htm 19 
Model II.b 
DV: Supranationalism Score 
Constitutional     Amsterdam Maastricht 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
EU Identific. 0.07 -0.03 0.03 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) 
Joint FP 0.10 0.35*** 0.13 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) 
GDP 5.89 -4.45* 4.02 
 (1.21) (2.10)  (3.51) 
Trust in US -11.48** 1.10 -3.50 
 (3.49) (4.90) (4.41) 
Inflation      -1.39 0.73 -0.15 
 (1.31) (0.97) (0.29) 
Benefits -0.01 -0.12** 0.13 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) 
Constant             19.91** -9.08 -2.95 
 (7.67) (16.17) (14.88) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N 15 15 12 
R-squared 0.83 0.81 0.67 
 
Model II.c 
DV: Supranationalism Score 
Constitutional     Amsterdam Maastricht 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Joint FP 0.07 0.25** -0.07 
 (0.04) (0.10) (0.05) 
Joint Defense 0.08*** 0.05 0.14*** 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) 
GDP -5.08 -4.13* 4.54** 
 (7.95) (1.97) (1.40) 
Trust in US -11.59*** 1.95 -7.80*** 
 (2.35) (4.69) (1.91) 
Inflation      -1.63* 0.84 -0.39** 
 (0.72) (0.90) (0.13) 
Benefits -0.03** -0.11** 0.15*** 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
Constant             29.00*** -9.53 19.75** 
 (5.17) (14.72) (6.88) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N 15 15 12 
R-squared 0.92 0.83 0.95 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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In Model II, based on country-level data, a series of OLS analyses were conducted using 
different configurations by including and excluding the variables EU identification and 
support for joint decision-making in foreign policy and in defence, respectively. The 
results reveal high degrees of overlap between public support for joint decision-making in 
foreign and defence policies and state support for supranationalism in these policy areas. 
For a long time, foreign and security policies were believed to be free from public input, 
yet our model shows that in all three treaties, voter representativeness is positive and 
statistically significant. That means during the IGCs on treaty reforms, governments took 
positions which closely correlated with collective opinions. Furthermore, even though 
Maastricht is considered a turning point in the sense that from that period on, the public 
became a significant factor in the equilibrium of European integration, our model 
indicates that even during the IGC on Political Union which paved the way for 
Maastricht, the positions of the representative bodies at the nation-state level largely 
corresponded to the preferences of the electorate.  
The congruence between public opinion and state positions is particularly strong in the 
supranationalization of defence policies. This means the more supportive an electorate is 
of joint decision-making in defence, the greater willingness a state displays in 
transferring sovereignty to the European Union in foreign and defence policies. Defence 
and security concern the very core aspects of sovereignty. The rather concrete security 
discourses embedded in European order as well as risk-averse electorates do not leave 
much maneuvering room for states to introduce new security policies and engage in risky 
endeavors without the fear of being punished in elections. Therefore, public support at 
home for joint decision-making, particularly in defence, becomes a must for governments 
to take a more supranational position in the IGCs. Given that, governments with a healthy 
level of public support at home for joint decision-making, such as Belgium, would be 
expected to have a greater margin for allowing further compromises to its sovereignty, 
while governments with shaky public support, such as the UK, tend to adopt a much 
stricter position and not allow any concessions to supranational agents.  
Model II indicates that at the aggregate level, the effect of European identification is not 
of statistical significance for any of the treaty negotiations. However, given the strong 
significance of EU identification on support for joint decision-making at the individual 
level and the high degrees of correlation between the two variables at the aggregate level, 
this was rather unsurprising. With regards to alternative explanations, our analysis found 
that neither state power in the form of GDP nor objective economic indicators in the form 
of inflation have any effect on the outcome variable. Two variables that seem to have 
some statistical significance are expected benefits from membership and trust in the 
United States. In terms of benefits, the regression coefficients are small, statistical 
significance varies from insignificance to only p<0.05, and its sign is negative in two 
IGCs but positive in the third. As it stands, contrary to our expectations, in the 
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Amsterdam and Constitutional treaties, those governments whose constituencies believe 
their country has benefitted from membership were less supportive of more 
supranationalism in foreign policy and defence. Even though a more robust check that 
includes a variable on policy-makers’ perception of benefits from foreign and defence 
policy cooperation is needed for a proper interpretation, this finding presents an apparent 
contradiction with the expectations of utilitarian approaches. In contrast to other policy 
areas, the public frequently uses simpler guidelines in foreign policy to reach judgments 
on the remote actors, issues and events which are the ingredients of foreign affairs (Holsti 
1996, 164). Although our model confirms public opinion drives governments in a 
particular direction, given the complex nature of foreign policy cooperation, states may 
not be willing to be cued by rather ambivalent public perception of benefits in their 
orientation towards supranationalism. 
Trust in the US does not have a considerable effect on state positions in Maastricht and 
Amsterdam, yet our analysis reveals that during the negotiation process of the 
Constitutional Treaty, it was a highly significant factor in shaping support for 
supranationalism. Member states whose constituencies are critical of US policies in 
ensuring peace were significantly more likely to support supranational integration in 
foreign policy and defence. The most likely factor responsible for this result is the divide 
created by 9/11 across Europe. Crystallized with the Letter of the Eight in January 2003 
and followed by the Vilnius Letter in February 2003
5
, there were fundamental differences 
of opinion between more federalist-oriented EU members, led by Germany and France, 
and the Atlanticists, led by the UK, on a number of issues ranging from how to conduct a 
war on terrorism through the utility of preemptive strikes to the precedence of 
international law. For Atlanticists, a tightly institutionalized European defence pillar 
would only help undermine NATO and thus would never be consented to, whereas for 
Europeanists, a Europe which relies on the United States for its security would never be 
able to rise as a global power, particularly given the apparent unbridgeable differences in 
views. 
                                                 
5
 The Letter of Eight was signed on January 30, 2003 by the heads of state of five EU members - Denmark, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom - along with three Central European countries which were to 
join the European Union in 2004. The letter expressed an open declaration of support for the American 
position on Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s violations of a UN resolution and indirect support for a future 
American intervention. Soon after, on February 6, 2003, the Vilnius Group comprising Albania, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania and Slovakia announced the 
Vilnius Letter, another declaration of support for the US ambition of overthrowing Hussein. 
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Figure 2: Effect of European Identification on government support for   
 supranationalism –results 
 
Based on the findings of two models, Figure 4 sketches the mechanisms of how public 
identification with the broader entity of Europe affects the integrationist preference of 
member states in selected issue areas. At sufficient levels of belonging to Europe, joint 
decision-making in the areas of foreign and defence policies, which touch on the most 
sensitive aspects of sovereignty, is no longer approached by fear and distress by citizens. 
By contrast, if individual self-categorization is restricted to one’s national identities, 
citizens are highly reluctant to transfer the locus of decision-making to Brussels. 
Governments usually engage in a two-level negotiation game, one at the domestic level 
with other political parties and interest groups and the other at the international level with 
other member states (Putnam 1988). If they aspire to be reelected, paying close attention 
to public opinion, particularly on increasingly salient European integration, becomes an 
integral part of political competition. Therefore, once public opinion is established in 
either direction through election mechanisms, it helps to consolidate the limits of the 
framework in which the government can bargain during the IGCs. 
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Conclusion 
This paper aimed to explain the varying levels of European Union member state support 
for supranational cooperation in foreign and defence policies during the course of 
negotiations prior to the three major EU treaties –Maastricht, Amsterdam and 
Constitutional. Drawing from the premises of ideational approaches, it is suggested that 
European identification by the public has a significant effect on state positions when 
consenting to the transfer of sovereignty to supranational agents. Accordingly, states with 
greater levels of public identification with Europe are expected to value supranational 
integration not only for the tangible benefits that such cooperation would provide, but 
also as a normative good. For those states, the transfer of authority from national to the 
supranational level would be regarded as the ‘right’ thing to do, since Europe would be 
considered as ‘us’, and not as just a collection of different states and societies sharing 
common borders. Where national and European identities “mesh and blend into each 
other”, European and national levels would be considered merely different layers of the 
same polity such that making critical foreign and security policy decisions at the 
supranational level would appear just as proper as making them at the national level 
(Risse 2005, 296). 
To investigate the dynamic relationship between European identification and state 
support over the course of the three treaty negotiations, this paper tested two interrelated 
hypotheses through fixed logit and ordinary least squares regression models based on 
individual and country-level data. After a thorough statistical analysis, it is concluded that 
at the individual level, self-identification with Europe along with the perception of 
benefits from membership and trust in Americans/the United States, emerge as strongly 
important factors in integrationist preference. As predicted, as the degree of self-
identification with Europe increases, the level of support for joint decision-making 
increases among citizens. At the country level, it was revealed that public attitude on 
sovereignty pooling in foreign and defence policies has a significant impact on states’ 
attitude towards supranational integration, indicating a high level of government 
responsiveness. Using the two models in tandem helped us reach the conclusion that 
higher levels of European identification lead to greater support for joint decision-making 
and this integrationist preference at the individual level drives state policies towards 
further supranationalism through election mechanisms. 
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Appendix I 
Table 3: State positions during the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union 
Countries 
QMV on 
principles 
QMV on 
implementation 
Increased 
powers for 
EC 
‘Tree 
Model' 
Common 
Defence 
Supranationality 
Score 
Belgium  Reluctant 
yes 
Yes Reluctant yes Yes Yes 8 
Denmark No No Reluctant yes No No -3 
France Reluctant Reluctant yes Reluctant No Yes 2 
Germany  Reluctant  Reluctant yes Reluctant yes Reluctant yes Yes 5 
Greece  No N.A. Reluctant Reluctant yes Yes 2 
Ireland  No No Yes N.A. Reluctant 0 
Italy  No Yes Yes Reluctant Yes 5 
Luxemburg N.A. N.A. Yes Reluctant Yes 4 
Netherlands Yes Yes Yes Yes No 7 
Portugal  No Reluctant Yes N.A. No 0 
Spain  Reluctant Reluctant yes Yes Reluctant yes Reluctant yes 5 
UK  No No Reluctant No No -4 
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Table 4: State positions during the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference 
Countries 
QMV on 
principles 
QMV on 
implement
ation 
Increased 
powers for 
EC 
Increased 
powers for 
EP 
New 
Supranational 
Bodies 
Integration 
of WEU 
Supranation
ality Score 
Austria  Reluctant 
yes 
Reluctant 
yes 
Yes  Reluctant Reluctant Reluctant yes 5 
Belgium Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  12 
Denmark  No Reluctant  No  N.A. No No -4 
Finland  No Reluctant 
yes 
No No  No Reluctant yes -2 
France No Yes No No Reluctant yes Yes  -2 
Germany  Reluctant 
yes 
Yes Yes Yes Reluctant yes Yes  10 
Greece  No No Reluctant 
yes 
Yes Reluctant  Reluctant 
yes 
2 
Ireland  No Yes No No Reluctant  Reluctant -1 
Italy  Reluctant 
yes 
Yes Reluctant Yes Yes Yes 9 
Luxemburg Reluctant 
yes 
Yes Yes N.A. Reluctant yes Yes  8 
Netherlands Reluctant 
yes 
Yes  Yes Yes Reluctant yes Reluctant yes 9 
Portugal  Reluctant Reluctant 
yes 
No No  Reluctant No -2 
Spain  Reluctant 
yes 
Reluctant 
yes 
Yes Reluctant 
yes 
Reluctant yes Reluctant yes 7 
Sweden  Reluctant Reluctant Reluctant N.A. No  N.A. -1 
UK  No No  No No No No  -6 
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Table 5: State positions during the 2004 Intergovernmental Conference 
Countries More QMV 
Supranational 
Foreign 
Policy Posts 
Stronger 
'Enhanced 
Cooperation' 
Mutual 
Assistance 
Clause 
New 
Supranational 
Bodies 
Supranationality 
Score 
Austria  Yes Yes Reluctant yes  Reluctant yes Reluctant yes 7 
Belgium  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  10 
Denmark  Reluctant yes  Reluctant Reluctant  No reluctant yes 1 
Finland  Reluctant yes Reluctant  No Reluctant  Reluctant yes 1 
France Reluctant Reluctant yes Yes Yes Yes  7 
Germany Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  10 
Greece  Reluctant yes Yes Reluctant yes Yes Yes 8 
Ireland  No Reluctant No No Reluctant -3 
Italy  Yes Yes Yes Reluctant yes Reluctant yes 8 
Luxemburg Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  10 
Netherlands Yes Yes  Reluctant yes Reluctant yes Yes 8 
Portugal  No Reluctant yes Reluctant Reluctant yes  Reluctant yes 2 
Spain  Reluctant yes Yes Yes Reluctant yes  Yes  8 
Sweden  Reluctant Reluctant  Reluctant Reluctant yes Reluctant yes 2 
UK No Reluctant  No Reluctant yes Reluctant yes  0 
 
EIoP   © 2015 Osman Sabri Kiratli 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2015-007a.htm 31 
Appendix II 
Variable Measurements, Origin and Descriptive Statistics 
MODEL I 
EB35 Variable
6
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max CODEBOOK  
 SUPPORT FOR 
DECISION-MAKING IN 
DEFENCE 
12488 1.516.816 .4997371 1 2 1 Decided By Natl Govt  
       2 Decided Jointly in EC  
       .d DK  
       .n   
Q34: “For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the 
European Union?” 
 SUPPORT FOR 
DECISION-MAKING IN 
FOREIGN POLICY 
11994 1.749.041 .4335829 1 2 1 Decided By Natl Govt  
       2 Decided Jointly in EC  
       .d DK  
       .n   
Q34: “For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government, or made jointly within the 
European Union?” 
 EUROPEAN 
IDENTIFICATION 
12731 2.263.373 .770219 1 3 1   
       2 Sometimes  
       3 Never  
                                                 
6
 Please find the corresponding question below each variable. 
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       .d DK  
Q13: “Do you ever think of yourself as not only [nationality], but also European? Does this happen often, sometimes or never?” 
 BENEFITS: EC 
MEMBERSHIP - 
COUNTRY  
11184 1.216.381 .4117951 1 2 1 Benefited  
       2 Not Benefited  
       .d DK  
       .n   
Q19: “Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the 
European Union?” 
 LEFT RIGHT PLACEMENT 10968 5.333.151 2.029.658 1 10    
 AGE RECODED - 6 
CATEGORIES 
13120 3.298.857 1.70312 1 6 1 15-24 years  
       2 25-34 years  
       3 35-44 years  
       4 45-54 years  
 EDUCATION 12943 4.707.332 3.220.546 1 10  1  
        3 16 
Years 
        5 18 
Years 
        9 22 
Years 
and 
Older 
 INCOME: HH 
QUARTILES 
(HARMONISED) 
9996 2.498.199 1.134.522 1 4 1 + + Highest  
       2 +  
       3 -  
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       4 - - Lowest  
 SUPPORT FOR EC 
MEMBERSHIP 
12547 1.38575 .7478633 1 3 1 A Good Thing  
       2 A Bad Thing  
       3 Neither Nor  
       .d DK  
Q18: Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the European Union is...? 
          
 TRUST IN US 12301 2.233.396 .8954683 1 4 1 Lot of trust  
       2 Some trust  
       3 Not very much trust  
Q7: I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a 
lot of trust, some trust, not very much trust or no trust at all ? 
          
EB46          
 SUPPORT FOR 
DECISION-MAKING IN 
DEFENCE 
15389 1.470.661 .4991547 1 2 1 NAT GOVERNMENT  
       2 EUROPEAN UNION  
       .a    
       .d DK  
 SUPPORT FOR 
DECISION-MAKING IN 
FOREIGN POLICY 
14977 1.712.159 .4527719 1 2 1 NAT GOVERNMENT  
       2 EUROPEAN UNION  
       .a    
       .d DK  
 EUROPEAN 
IDENTIFICATION 
15834 1.639.131 .7824738 1 4 1 (NATIONALITY) only  
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       2 (NATIONALITY) and 
European 
 
       3 European and 
(NATIONALITY) 
 
       4 European only  
Q10: In the near future, do you see yourself as: [nationality] only; [nationality] and European; European and [nationality]; or European only?”  
 BENEFITS: EC 
MEMBERSHIP - 
COUNTRY  
13131 1.407.204 .4913322 1 2 1 Benefited  
       2 Not benefited  
       .a   
       .d DK  
 LEFT RIGHT PLACEMENT 13485 5.177.011 2.013.461 1 10    
 AGE RECODED - 6 
CATEGORIES 
16248 3.370.015 1.68804 1 6 1 15-24 years  
       2 25-34 years  
       3 35-44 years  
       4 45-54 years  
       5 55-64 years  
 EDUCATION 16248 2.607.441 2.499.532 6 98 14   
       16   
       19   
       23   
 INCOME: HH 
QUARTILES 
(HARMONISED) 
12081 2.499.048 1.108.077 1 4 1 --  
       2 -  
       3 +  
       4 ++  
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 SUPPORT FOR EU 
MEMBERSHIP 
15049 1.652.734 .771088 1 3 1 Good thing  
       2 Neither good nor bad 
(questionnaire code 3) 
       3 Bad thing (questionnaire code 2) 
 TRUST IN US 14764 2.318.206 .9035693 1 4 1 Lot of trust  
       2 Some trust  
       3 Not very much trust  
EB58          
 SUPPORT FOR 
DECISION-MAKING IN 
DEFENCE 
15389 1.45669 .4981369 1 2 Numeric Label  
       1 (NATIONALITY) 
government 
 
       2 Jointly within European 
Union 
 
       .d DK  
 SUPPORT FOR 
DECISION-MAKING IN 
FOREIGN POLICY 
15012 1.74607 .4352726 1 2 1  (NATIONALITY) 
government 
 
       2 Jointly within European 
Union 
 
       .d DK  
 EUROPEAN 
IDENTIFICATION 
15737 1.708.267 .7220321 1 4 1 (NATIONALITY) only  
       2 (NATIONALITY) and 
European 
 
       3 European and 
(NATIONALITY) 
 
       4 European only  
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Q32: In the near future, do you see yourself as: [nationality] only; [nationality] and European; European and [nationality]; or European only? 
 BENEFITS: EC 
MEMBERSHIP - 
COUNTRY  
13120 1.329.116 .46991 1 2 1 Benefited  
       2 Not benefited  
       .d DK  
 LEFT RIGHT PLACEMENT 12986 5.216.695 1.958.055 1 10    
 INCOME: HH 
QUARTILES 
(HARMONISED) 
10763 2.450.804 1.12624 1 4 1   -- (Lowest income 
quartile ) 
 
       2   - (Next to Lowest income quartile 
) 
       3   + (Next to Highest income 
) 
 
 EDUCATION 16062 2.625.395 2.500.107 6 98       
 AGE RECODED - 6 
CATEGORIES 
16074 3.52476 1.720.981 1 6 1 15-24 years  
       2 25-34 years  
       3 35-44 years  
       4 45-54 years  
       5 55-64 years  
 SUPPORT FOR EU 
MEMBERSHIP 
15219 1.520.271 .6955587 1 3 1 Good thing  
       2 Neither good nor bad 
(questionnaire code 3) 
       3 Bad thing (questionnaire code 2) 
 TRUST IN US 15080 1.827.785 .6802549 1 3 1 Positive  
       2 Negative  
       3 Neither positive nor  
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negative 
Q48: In your opinion, would you say that the United States tends to play a positive role, a negative role or neither a positive nor a negative 
role regarding ...? 
 
MODEL II 
 Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max CODING 
 SUPRANATIONALISM 42 3,761905 4,761684 -6 12 See the text for the construction of 
supranationalism index 
 EUROPEAN 
IDENTIFICATION 
42 70,11905 18,83588 42 123 For the EB 35, the answers ‘never’ are coded 
0, ‘sometimes’ coded 1 and ‘often’ coded 2. 
For the EBs 46 and 58, the answers ‘European 
only’ are coded 3, ‘European and 
[nationality]’ 2, ‘[nationality] and European’ 1 
and finally ‘[nationality] only’ 0. The index 
scores are computed by taking the average 
across respondents.  
 EU JOINT DEFENSE 42 4,095238 32,47799 -56 86 Percentage of 'jointly with the EU' responses 
in related EB questions is subtracted from the 
percentage of 'national only' responses. 
 EU JOINT FP 42 -43,5952 17,94852 -70 -6 Percentage of 'jointly with the EU' responses 
in related EB questions is subtracted from the 
percentage of 'national only' responses 
 GDP 42 564141,3 606658,4 11589,44 2199870 In US$ 
 TRUST IN US 42 2,416416 0,523997 1,375 3,2 Means are calculated by applying the 
coefficients 4, 3, 2 and 1 respectively to the 
answer codes in related EB questions. 
 INFLATION 42 3,55 3,546503 0,5 20,4  
 EU MEMBERSHIP-
BENEFITS 
42 31 29,45853 -39 81 Percentage of negative responses in related 
EB questions is subtracted from the 
percentage of positive responses. 
 
